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Okta narrows the impact of its January 2022 compromise

20 April 2022 (source display) · Investigation conclusion published · day-level date

Current first-party page displays 20 April 2022. Other contemporary accounts use 19 April; this record explicitly follows the source display. The intrusion occurred 21 January.

Okta’s final account substantially narrows the exposure initially discussed after the LAPSUS$ claims.

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Okta’s final investigation found that an attacker controlled one Sitel support engineer’s workstation for 25 consecutive minutes on 21 January 2022 and accessed two active customer tenants through the SuperUser support application.

The company reported no successful configuration changes, multifactor-authentication or password resets, support impersonation events, or direct authentication to Okta accounts. These findings distinguish confirmed access from the earlier maximum potential scope of 366 customers.

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Associated identifiers: G1004

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Cites this map entry. Original evidence is linked below.

The source trail

Stable entry ID: okta-lapsus-investigation-conclusion. Dates retain the source precision. See methodology and corrections.