Events / historical milestone
Okta narrows the impact of its January 2022 compromise
Current first-party page displays 20 April 2022. Other contemporary accounts use 19 April; this record explicitly follows the source display. The intrusion occurred 21 January.
Okta’s final account substantially narrows the exposure initially discussed after the LAPSUS$ claims.
Open this milestone in the interactive map ↗Okta’s final investigation found that an attacker controlled one Sitel support engineer’s workstation for 25 consecutive minutes on 21 January 2022 and accessed two active customer tenants through the SuperUser support application.
The company reported no successful configuration changes, multifactor-authentication or password resets, support impersonation events, or direct authentication to Okta accounts. These findings distinguish confirmed access from the earlier maximum potential scope of 366 customers.
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- Microsoft profiles LAPSUS$ / DEV-0537 — Okta’s investigation following LAPSUS$ claims; confirmed scope qualified
Associated identifiers: G1004
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