# Molerats — reported activity bound

Groups and organisations · Active by 2012 in MITRE’s account · Earliest reported activity

MITRE dates Molerats activity to 2012; other vendor histories extend the label further back.

2012 follows exact MITRE group description; Unit42’s earlier2011 account retained explicitly rather than silently reconciled.

Unit 42 describes operations as far back as 2011. These source bounds differ and do not establish an exact creation date or a single immutable membership list.

Kaspersky’s 2019 model identifies Molerats as Gaza Cybergang Group1 and distinguishes other groups under the same umbrella. Arabic-language targeting and political motives do not alone identify a state sponsor.

## Connections

- [SneakyPastes research separates Gaza Cybergang activity sets](https://cyberhistorymap.com/records/molerats-sneakypastes-research-2019/): Kaspersky models Molerats as Gaza Cybergang Group1
- [Spark-linked phishing campaign targets government and telecom organizations](https://cyberhistorymap.com/records/molerats-spark-campaign-2019/): Unit42 describes campaign as likely related to Molerats

Associated identifiers: G0021. See the [data format](https://cyberhistorymap.com/data-format.md) for association scope.

## Sources

- [MITRE ATT&CK: Molerats, G0021](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0021/)
- [Unit 42: Molerats delivers Spark to government and telecom organizations](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/molerats-delivers-spark-backdoor/)
- [Kaspersky: Gaza Cybergang Group1, SneakyPastes, 10 April 2019](https://securelist.com/gaza-cybergang-group1-operation-sneakypastes/90068/)

Stable entry ID: molerats-reported-activity. Created by Cr8ivtek Inc.
