# Industroyer2 targets Ukrainian electricity infrastructure

Events · 2022-04-08 · Attempted destructive deployment

An attempted attack against a Ukrainian energy provider combined industrial-control malware with destructive tools for ordinary computers. ESET and CERT-UA investigated and worked to protect the affected network.

Date of the attempted operation. It is not evidence of a completed electricity outage; the research disclosure followed on 12 April.

ESET’s incident timeline records destructive actions and a scheduled Industroyer2 launch on 8 April 2022. The researchers assessed Sandworm responsibility with high confidence.

This marker records the attempted operation, not a confirmed blackout. MITRE’s software record says the payload was found before deployment and caused no impact; the publication of ESET’s analysis followed on 12 April.

## Connections

- [Sandworm Team](https://cyberhistorymap.com/records/sandworm/): ESET assessed Sandworm responsibility with high confidence
- [A second cyberattack disrupts Ukraine’s power grid](https://cyberhistorymap.com/records/ukraine-power-attack-2016/): Later attempted operation used a new Industroyer variant

Associated identifiers: G0034. See the [data format](https://cyberhistorymap.com/data-format.md) for association scope.

## Sources

- [ESET: Industroyer2, incident timeline and attribution](https://blog.eset.ie/2022/04/12/industroyer2-industroyer-reloaded/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK: Industroyer2 and prevented impact](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1072/)

Stable entry ID: industroyer2-attempt. Created by Cr8ivtek Inc.
